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WHY ENGLISH-ONLY NOTICE TO SPANISH-ONLY
SPEAKERS IS NOT ENOUGH: THE ARGUMENT
FOR ENHANCING PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS IN NEW MEXICO
Lysette P. Romero*
“Si acaso doblares la vara de la justicia, no sea con el peso de la
da´diva, sino con el de la misericordia.”—Miguel de Cervantes1
INTRODUCTION
A language barrier creates daily frustration and feelings of aliena-
tion for those who do not speak America’s language. Perhaps the only
way to appreciate the burden placed on those who are unable to speak
the native language of those around them is to find oneself in that very
situation.
Imagine that you are an American tourist in Paris, France. You have
just visited one of the most stunning cathedrals in the city—the Saint-
Etienne-du-Mont. You have taken sightseeing to a whole new level this
day and are completely exhausted. You hop into your rental car, pull into
traffic and head for your hotel. Suddenly, you see the flash of lights in
your rearview mirror—it is the police. The officer speaks to you in
French, and you attempt to explain to him that you do not speak
French—English only. You present identification, rental papers, but you
have not the faintest idea what he is saying or what he wants from you, as
you are unable to understand his words or decipher his gestures. Eventu-
ally, he loses patience, hands you a piece of paper while pointing to it and
* University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2012. The author
wishes to thank Professor Ted Occhialino for providing the inspiration for this note,
Professor Margaret Montoya for her insights and assistance, and Tara Kinman for her
encouragement and indispensable advice. For my family whose support, love, and
guidance I cherish deeply, and to my daughter, Anjolie Romero Co´rdova: Eres una
bendicio´n maravillosa. Te amo, mi hija. Thank you for the daily reminders of what is
most important.
1. This quote is inscribed on a wall at the University of New Mexico School of
Law. The quote originally appeared in chapter 42 of Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quix-
ote. In English it means: “If perchance thou permittest the staff of justice to bend, let
it be not by the weight of a gift, but by that of mercy.”
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leaves. As you might expect, it is written in French. Several days before
leaving the country, you seek out someone who might be able to provide
a reliable translation of the document. After all, it is probably important.
You seek out an official source—you go to a police station, where several
officers speak English and can explain the meaning and purpose of the
document. They inform you that you are to pay several thousand dollars
because you allegedly violated numerous traffic laws while driving that
day—some of them quite serious. You could have contested the allega-
tions at a hearing, but since you failed to do so within the required time
period, that is no longer an option. The piece of paper the officer handed
you was a “notice” that was meant to inform you of the charges against
you, your right to a hearing to contest those charges, and the time period
in which you needed to request the hearing.
Now imagine that the general circumstances just described actually
occurred here in the United States—even in New Mexico. Even if the
federal Constitution fails to protect a right to Spanish-language notice,
does the New Mexico Constitution provide the legal framework for a
right to notice that actually informs you, in Spanish, of your rights?
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: MASO V. N.M. TAXATION
& REVENUE DEP’T
In 2004, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether per-
sonal notice of an administrative proceeding to a Spanish-only speaker
satisfied federal due process requirements when the notice was written
solely in English.2 While the court held that the English-only notice did
not offend federal due process requirements, the question of whether
state law might require a different outcome was left unanswered.3 The
issue before the court stemmed from a December 8, 2001, incident involv-
ing Raphael Maso, a Spanish-only speaker, who was stopped at a sobriety
checkpoint and arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.4 As
2. See Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 1, 96 P.3d
286, 287.
3. See id.
4. Id. ¶ 2, 96 P.3d at 287. Although this issue arises in the context of a DWI, the
argument posited in this note is about notice requirements for Spanish-only speakers
in the state—in all contexts. It is not about an accused drunk driver seeking to avoid
justice, as many would call it “on a technicality.” Indeed, many of the most protected
and valued constitutional rights that all of us are entitled to, empathetic party or not,
came to be as a result of unthinkable crimes committed by unsympathetic individuals.
For example, consider Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which Ernesto
Miranda was suspected of kidnapping and raping an eighteen year-old woman. The
U.S. Supreme Court overturned his conviction and announced that an individual ar-
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required by law, Maso submitted to a breath test that resulted in a .17
blood alcohol concentration reading, exceeding the legal limit of .08.5
Under New Mexico’s Implied Consent Act,6 when an individual submits
to a chemical test that results in an alcohol concentration in the person’s
blood or breath over the statutory limit, the law enforcement officer ad-
ministering the test must serve “immediate written notice” upon that in-
dividual.7 The notice serves to inform the individual of the revocation of
their driver’s license and of their right to a hearing regarding the revoca-
tion.8 Pursuant to this statute, the arresting officer personally served
Maso with an English-language “Notice of Revocation” of his driving
privileges, which stated that any request for a hearing to contest the revo-
cation “‘must be made in writing within ten (10) days from the date of
service of this notice.’”9 The officer did not explain the contents of the
notice, despite having conversed with Maso in Spanish during the inci-
dent.10 On January 7, 2002, Maso’s attorney mailed a letter requesting a
hearing.11 Two days later, the Motor Vehicle Division of the Taxation and
Revenue Department sent a standard letter rejecting the request and cit-
ing Maso’s failure to request the hearing within the required ten-day
period.12
Maso appealed the Motor Vehicle Division’s decision to the district
court. The district court concluded that the English-language notice and
rested or otherwise taken into custody by the police must be informed of their Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 444. Otherwise, any statements made by the sus-
pect while in police custody are inadmissible in court. Id. Though Miranda “got off on
a technicality,” his case gave rise to a right that is one of the most safeguarded today.
See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Lance Big Man, 2000-CROW-7, ¶ 37, available at
http://www.littlehorn.com/Crow_Court/Decisions /Tribe%20v.%20Big%20Man.htm#
Top (“Compared to the popular misconception that any violation of a defendant’s
Miranda rights will allow him to ‘get off on a technicality,’ the scope of the Miranda
rule is quite limited.”).
5. Maso, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 4, 85 P.3d at 276, 278; see also NMSA 1978, § 66-8-
111.1 (2003).
6. NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-105 to -112.
7. Id. § 66-8-111.1.
8. Id.
9. Maso, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 4, 85 P.3d at 278 (quoting language from the Notice
of Revocation). The New Mexico Court of Appeals also addressed jurisdictional is-
sues raised with regard to the scope of original and appellate jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court, but these issues are beyond the scope of this note. See id. at ¶¶ 10–17.
10. Id. ¶ 4.
11. Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 2, 96 P.3d 286,
287.
12. Id. ¶ 2, 96 P.3d at 287–88.
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denial of a hearing did not violate due process as Maso argued.13 Maso
then appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals.14 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that “English-lan-
guage notice regarding administrative revocation is compatible with due
process when it is personally delivered to a driver during the course of his
arrest for driving under the influence.”15
The court of appeals acknowledged that procedural due process re-
quirements are applicable to administrative proceedings, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson.16 On the issue of the sufficiency of the
notice, the court cited to federal case law and the most fundamental rule
of procedural due process as set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.17 The court stated, “due process mandates ‘notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.’”18 Actual notice, the court noted, is not necessa-
rily required—especially in the administrative context.19 The court con-
cluded that the issue was not whether Maso understood the notice, but
whether it was reasonably calculated to inform him of the ten-day time
limit for contesting revocation of his driver’s license.20 From this legal
framework, the court deduced that because Maso received a document
“clearly labeled” as a revocation and because it was marked with the seal
of the State of New Mexico, the notice was sufficient given that “a rea-
sonable driver who did not understand the contents of the notice would
inquire further.”21 In other words, the notice comported with due process
because it should have prompted Maso to inquire as to its contents with
enough time for him to request the hearing.
A. The New Mexico Supreme Court Decision in Maso
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted Maso’s petition for certio-
rari and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision under federal due process
13. Id. ¶ 3, 96 P.3d at 288.
14. Id. ¶ 6.
15. Maso, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 21, 85 P.3d at 282.
16. Id. ¶ 19, 85 P.3d at 281 (citing 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)).
17. Id. (citing 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
18. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 20, 85 P.3d at 282. This form of notice is known as “inquiry notice,”
which is defined as “[n]otice attributed to a person when the information would lead
an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 494 (3d pocket ed. 2001).
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requirements. The court declined to address Maso’s argument that the
New Mexico Constitution should provide him with more protection
under its Due Process Clause than that recognized under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.22 Because
Maso first made the state constitutional argument in the New Mexico
Supreme Court, the court held that Maso had failed to preserve the argu-
ment for appellate determination.23
Since the New Mexico Supreme Court’s ruling in Maso, the argu-
ment for more expansive procedural due process rights for Spanish-only
speakers under New Mexico’s Constitution has been advanced in one ad-
ditional case.24 However, like in Maso, in State ex rel. Children Youth &
Families Dep’t v. William M. the argument had not been properly pre-
served, and the court therefore declined to rule on the issue.25 Accord-
ingly, there has been no pronouncement as to whether New Mexico
courts are willing or compelled to expand notice requirements under the
New Mexico Constitution.
B. Note Outline
This note will explore the argument that under New Mexico’s Due
Process Clause,26 notice to Spanish-only speakers—even at administrative
level proceedings—is insufficient if it is provided solely in English. The
note posits that if a case were brought up on appeal with facts analogous
to those in Maso and the argument for a diverging standard under the
New Mexico Constitution was properly preserved and argued, New Mex-
ico courts should extend Spanish-language notice to Spanish-only speak-
ers in New Mexico. While some lower federal courts have ruled on the
issue, the U.S. Supreme Court has not. In choosing to deviate from fed-
eral case law, New Mexico would establish a new state right to Spanish-
language or bilingual notice.
Part I has already set out the factual and procedural background of
Maso, which prompted this note and the arguments that it posits. Part II
of this note sets forth the applicable legal standards, including founda-
tional due process requirements and New Mexico’s approach for inde-
pendent state constitutional interpretation. Part III presents an analysis
of the issue and offers the conclusion that there exists a strong basis for
22. Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 286,
289.
23. Id.
24. See State ex rel. Children Youth & Families Dep’t. v. William M., 2007-
NMCA-055, 161 P.3d 262.
25. Id. at 35–39, 161 P.3d at 270–71.
26. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
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extending such a right in New Mexico. The argument for broader protec-
tions under New Mexico’s constitution is based on: (1) the historical
background of the state, including the original iteration and surviving
constitutional protections for Spanish-language speakers explicit in the
1911 constitution; (2) other New Mexico laws and regulations that require
bilingual forms, documents, and publications, which bolster arguments
about the state’s broadly interpreted public policy stance requiring Span-
ish-language notices; (3) the language characteristics of New Mexico’s
current population; (4) the relatively low burden on the state in translat-
ing notice for Spanish-only speakers as weighed against the rights of and
potential impact on the individual; and (5) a survey of other jurisdictions’
conclusions on the subject and analysis of the reasoning as it applies to
New Mexico. These sources serve as the framework for the analysis in
Part III.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Procedural Due Process: The Mullane Standard for Notice
1. The Federal Standard of Notice
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
safeguard individuals from governmental action that deprives any indi-
vidual of “life, liberty or property without due process of law.”27 The
mandates of due process have been interpreted to encompass both sub-
stantive and procedural requirements.28 The fundamental elements of
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”). The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, Sec-
tion One of the United States Constitution states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. With regard to the circumstances in Maso, drivers’ licenses are considered a
liberty interest because the government controls who may and may not drive automo-
biles. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §17.4(d)(iv) (4th ed. 2007). Thus, Maso must be
afforded due process before his driver’s license can be revoked. See Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that a state may not suspend a driver’s license with-
out affording the licensee the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment); State v. Herrera, 111 N.M. 560, 562, 807 P.2d 744, 746 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing City of Albuquerque v. Juarez, 93 N.M. 188, 598 P.2d 650 (Ct. App. 1979)
(“Except under certain emergency situations, notice and opportunity for a hearing are
required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment before termination
of an individual’s driving privileges may be revoked.”).
28. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, §17.1. R
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procedural due process are notice29 and an opportunity to be heard.30
Thus, the government must notify individuals, by written document, of
government actions and proceedings that affect any legally protected in-
terest.31 While this does not require “heroic efforts”32 on the part of the
government, it must satisfy the basic requirement set forth in Mullane
that notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.”33 An inquiry must be
made as to the appropriate method of notice on an ad hoc basis—in other
words, the reasonableness of notice depends on the factual circumstances
in any given case.34 Because the focus needs to be on the reasonableness
of notice in light of a particular party in a particular set of circumstances,
adequate notice in one situation, to one individual, is not necessarily ade-
quate in a different situation or to a different individual.35 Sufficiency of
notice is examined with reference to its ability to actually inform parties
of pendency of proceedings that affect their interests.36 The availability of
alternatives is also a factor in determining the sufficiency of notice.37 No-
tice that functions as a “mere gesture” is insufficient.38
Whatever the method employed in any given case, the means must
be “such as one desirous of actually informing” the party whose rights
may be affected.39 In other words, the goals and actions must convey an
intent to bring about actual notice.40 However, actual41 notice is not al-
29. For Procedural Due Process purposes, “notice” can encompass any number of
contexts, each potentially requiring a different analysis. For purposes of this note,
“notice” includes any type of notice that governmental entities are required to give to
individuals in the course of a potential deprivation of life, liberty, or property interest.
It does not include notice from one private individual to another, including lawsuit
notice, also known as Rule 4 notice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4. This limitation is not based
on the argument’s inability to extend to such notice, but on the enormous task in-
volved in analyzing all types of notice in this context.
30. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
31. See id.
32. Dunsenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).
33. Id. at 168.
34. See Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 2000).
35. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
36. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982).
37. Id. at 454.
38. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (hold-
ing that notice by publication in a newspaper to parties whose addresses were known
is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. Id.
40. See Dunsenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170–72 (2002).
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ways necessary to satisfy due process.42 As long as the means employed
meet the Mullane reasonableness requirement, due process has been sat-
isfied regardless of whether actual notice was achieved.43
To determine reasonableness, courts employ a balancing test: the
burden on the government is weighed against the individual’s interest in
receiving notice to determine whether the form of notice was indeed rea-
sonable and thus sufficient to satisfy due process.44 Thus, when actual no-
tice is not reasonably feasible, notice is adequate as long as the form
chosen is “not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes.”45 Conversely, when there is an
efficient and inexpensive alternative that could be employed to effectuate
actual notice, anything less than actual notice is unreasonable.46
2. The New Mexico Standard for Notice
New Mexico procedural due process caselaw tracks the federal stan-
dard. Citing Mullane, relevant New Mexico case law places an emphasis
on notice “‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’”47 This is a considera-
tion of context. For example, one’s rights are less compelling when the
individual faces administrative revocation of their driver’s license, rather
than potential incarceration as a result of a criminal trial. Thus, the rea-
sonableness of notice requires much less in administrative proceedings
because the right at stake is not as significant as those involved in other
contexts. Still, this consideration of context is the federal standard—i.e.,
reasonableness under the circumstances in light of the individual’s and
state’s respective rights—articulated in a different way. Essentially, then,
41. In general, there are three types of service (ways to effectuate notice): “ac-
tual,” “substituted,” and “constructive.” Professor Ted Occhialino, Univ. of N.M.
Emeritus Professor of Law, Civil Procedure I: Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
(2010) (notes on file with author).
42. See Dunsenbery, 534 U.S. at 170–73 (holding that a certified letter satisfied
due process even though it had never been received).
43. See id.; City of Albuquerque v. Juarez, 93 N.M. 188, 190, 598 P.2d 650, 652 (Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that actual notice is not required for an administrative suspen-
sion), overruled on other grounds by State v. Herrera, 111 N.M. 560, 807 P.2d 744 (Ct.
App. 1991).
44. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229–39 (2006) (holding that the Mullane
reasonableness test was the appropriate standard for determining the adequacy of
notice and that balancing the state’s and individual’s respective interests was the in-
quiry to be made to determine if the form was indeed reasonable).
45. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
46. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983); Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982).
47. Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 286,
289 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313).
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both the federal standard and the New Mexico standard for determining
the sufficiency of notice involve a weighing of the state’s and individual’s
respective interests on an ad hoc basis.
New Mexico courts have interpreted the federal standard for notice
as assuming that the intended recipient of notice as being “desirous of
actually being informed.”48 Thus, the reasonableness of notice is not af-
fected by a recipient who makes efforts to avoid being notified.49 New
Mexico courts have also rejected other jurisdictions’ measure of the ade-
quacy of notice that only require consideration of circumstances known
by the sender as of the date of the initial attempt of notice.50 Instead, New
Mexico reads Mullane’s use of the phrase “under all the circumstances”
as extending to circumstances occurring after the initial notice attempt.51
Thus, when an initial attempt at notice fails, the sender must consider the
failed attempt and whether, in light of that failure, it was indeed a reason-
able attempt under the circumstances.52 As a result of this “second look”
requirement, notice may be insufficient if an initial attempt at notice is
made, but fails, and there is no further reasonable method employed.53
Satisfying the Mullane standard ensures that notice, in any given sit-
uation, is constitutionally sufficient, but notice must also comply with any
applicable statutes and rules of the jurisdiction where the action is pend-
ing. Thus, if there is a deficiency of notice at any level, the notice is inade-
quate and violates due process. For example, if the rule and statute are
followed, but the notice does not meet the state or federal constitutional
requirements, the notice is insufficient. All state and federal statutory and
rule requirements for notice must be met in addition to the constitutional
mandates in order to effectuate sufficient notice.
B. Gomez: The Interstitial Approach to Greater Constitutional
Protection in New Mexico
Until 1976, New Mexico courts interpreted the New Mexico Consti-
tution in “lock-step” with the federal Constitution, which means that the
federal and New Mexico constitutions were treated as affording exactly
the same rights.54 The state constitution did not serve as an independent
48. Cordova v. State, 2005-NMCA-009, ¶ 30, 104 P.3d 1104, 1112 (emphasis
omitted).
49. Id. (holding that a recipient’s failure to accept notice via certified letter did
not affect the reasonableness of the attempt to serve notice sent to correct address).
50. See id. ¶ 23, 104 P.3d at 1110.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.; Rule 1-004(F) NMRA.
54. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶16, 932 P.2d 1, 6.
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tool for protecting individual rights. Where the federal Constitution had
been interpreted to protect certain rights, so too did the New Mexico
Constitution. Likewise, where the federal Constitution was interpreted as
not protecting an asserted right, neither did the New Mexico Constitu-
tion. There were no independent interpretations of the New Mexico Con-
stitution until State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges,55 in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court moved away from “lock-step” interpretation acknowledg-
ing that “states have inherent power as separate sovereigns in our feder-
alist system to provide more liberty than is mandated by the United
States Constitution.”56 Thus, the court stated:
We now consider Article II, § 13 of the New Mexico Constitution.
We do so as the ultimate arbiters of the law of New Mexico. We
are not bound to give the same meaning to the New Mexico Con-
stitution as the United States Supreme Court places upon the
United States Constitution, even in construing provisions having
wording that is identical, or substantially so, “unless such interpre-
tations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire citi-
zenry under the federal charter.”57
In 1997, in State v. Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court for-
mally adopted the interstitial approach to interpreting state constitutional
provisions that are independent, but analogous to those in the federal
Constitution.58 Under the interstitial approach, the first inquiry is whether
the asserted right is protected under the federal Constitution.59 If it is
protected, the court will not reach the state constitutional issue.60 If it is
not protected, the argument is examined to determine whether state
constitutional provisions warrant an extension of additional rights or a
deviation from federal law.61 The state court will deviate from federal law
for three reasons: (1) “a flawed federal analysis”; (2) “structural differ-
55. State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976).
56. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 932 P.2d at 7 (interpreting State ex rel. Serna
v. Hodges).
57. Serna, 89 N.M. at 356, 552 P.2d at 792 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d
1099, 1112 (Cal. 1975)).
58. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1. The “interstitial” approach is one of
three ways that states interpret state constitutional provisions that are independent,
but analogous to those in the federal constitution. See id. ¶ 18, 932 P.2d 7. Gomez
does an exceptional job of describing the three approaches and also analyzes the
soundness of each approach. Id.
59. Id. ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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ences between state and federal government”; or (3) “distinctive state
characteristics.”62
Since this pronouncement of state sovereignty, New Mexico courts
have expanded rights under the state constitution in important areas of
individual rights.63 Both state legislative history and traditions have been
employed to argue for broader state constitutional rights in New Mex-
ico.64 Using “distinctive state characteristics” as the basis for independent
state constitutional interpretation, one scholar has suggested that:
[C]ounsel look beyond the legal aspects . . . for state constitu-
tional law analysis. In particular, counsel should consider the role
of the state’s multi-cultural demographic makeup in influencing
public attitudes and policies. This makeup includes the recogni-
tion that New Mexico is, at a minimum, a bilingual state in terms
of actual language usage. It is also a border state, resulting in sig-
nificant interaction with a population not only from outside its
state borders, but across the national border with Mexico. Conse-
quently, it is subject to influences not only from Mexico, but other
Latin American nations that press toward the United States bor-
der in terms of population shifts and political and social
traditions.65
Indeed, advocates have looked beyond legal aspects in advancing
arguments in favor of expanding state constitutional rights. For example,
one scholar advocated for stricter requirements when Spanish-only
speakers are waiving their Miranda rights.66 This, of course, was in a con-
text other than procedural due process.67 In that instance, the require-
ments for preservation of greater state constitutional arguments under
Gomez were not met, and thus the issue was not addressed.68 In his con-
currence, Justice Bosson called it “unfortunate [that] a better record was
not made below on which we could consider a different standard under
our state constitution.”69 He continued, “[g]iven the linguistic and cultural
62. Id.
63. For in-depth information regarding the extent to which New Mexico courts
have been receptive to differing interpretation of the New Mexico Constitution see J.
Thomas Sullivan, Developing a State Constitutional Law Strategy in New Mexico
Criminal Prosecutions, 39 N.M. L. REV. 407 (2009).
64. See id. at 452, 456.
65. Id. at 460–61.
66. See id.; see also State v. Castillo-Sanchez, 1999-NMCA-085, ¶¶ 34–35, 984
P.2d 787, 795–96 (Bosson, J., concurring).
67. Castillo-Sanchez, 1999-NMCA-085, ¶¶ 34–35, 984 P.2d 787, 795–96.
68. Id. ¶ 21, 984 P.2d at 793.
69. Id. ¶ 34, 984 P.2d at 795 (Bosson, J., concurring).
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differences our state enjoys, not to mention our border with Mexico, our
citizens should demand no less [than record of a clear understanding that
a Spanish-only speaking defendant waived his rights] as part of intelli-
gent, responsible law enforcement.”70 The express willingness of New
Mexico courts to consider an argument based on this state’s distinctive
history, culture and other characteristics makes the argument posited in
this note imminent and palpable.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SALIENCE OF NEW MEXICO’S
DISTINCTIVENESS: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The California Supreme Court, in one of the earliest decisions on
the issue of whether due process requires Spanish-language notice, notes
that the United States is primarily an English-speaking nation.71 How-
ever, that was not always the case in New Mexico (and, ironically, neither
was it always the case in California). New Mexico’s people, government,
and other characteristics, both past and present, clearly reflect the state’s
history as a former majority Spanish-speaking population. These histori-
cal and present day characteristics serve as the basis for an argument of
differing state constitutional interpretation for Spanish-only speakers in
New Mexico. To understand the argument for a different interpretation
of the state’s constitution founded on distinctive state characteristics, one
must have a basic understanding of New Mexico history.
A. The Distinctiveness of the Spanish Language in New Mexico
In 1848, under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mex-
ico ceded its northern territory to the United States, including present-
70. Id.
71. Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1973); see also infra Part III.C.
Like New Mexico, California was, at one time, part of the Mexican territory that was
later ceded to the United States. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settle-
ment with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. V, July 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [herein-
after Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico
relinquished a significant portion of their territory to the United States, including an
area that today comprises most of New Mexico and California. Id. This is one reason
the numbers of Spanish-only speakers in California and New Mexico—both upon
statehood and presently—are significantly higher than other states. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME AND ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE
POPULATION 5 YEARS AND OVER BY STATE (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t20/tab04.pdf (last visited June 6, 2011) (reporting
that 8,105,505 Californians speak Spanish at home in addition to English and 485,681
in New Mexico).
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day New Mexico.72 Among the provisions of the treaty was language that
was intended to establish relationships between the people in the con-
quered territory and those who were to control and occupy it.73 Scholars
have called it an “interim bill of rights” for the people in the conquered
territory.74 It is from this period of time that New Mexico can trace its
original and lasting protections for Spanish-speaking people in the state.
Many of these protections were incorporated, and reiterated, in the state
constitution ratified in January 1911.75
At the time that New Mexico was ceded to the United States, there
were approximately 75,000 Spanish-speaking people in the southwest—
60,000 of which were in New Mexico.76 Several proposed terms of the
treaty concerned the rights of the Mexican citizens in the ceded terri-
tory.77 Three articles in the treaty were presented as Mexico attempted to
protect their citizens in the ceded territories.78 The first gave the people in
the territory the option to return to Mexico with their portable property
or remain there as Mexican citizens or as U.S. citizens—whichever they
chose.79 This article was the only one that was accepted as part of the
treaty.80 The other two, one which demanded statehood as soon as possi-
ble and the other, which dealt with land grants, were rejected.81
At the time of the treaty in 1848, Congress was hesitant to admit
New Mexico to the Union.82 In fact, New Mexico was kept out of the
72. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 71. R
73. Guillermo Lux, The New Mexico Constitution and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, RACE, RACISM, AND THE LAW Part I, http://academic.udayton.edu/race/02
rights/guadalu2.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
74. Id.
75. See NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT 223 (F. Chris Garcia & Paul L. Hain eds.,
1976).
76. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND NEW MEXICO
STATEHOOD in MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL STUDY, THE EXCLUDED STU-
DENT: EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES AFFECTING MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE SOUTH-
WEST 76–82 (1972), available at http://www.ped.state.nm.us/BilingualMulticultural/
dl09/Language%20Rights%20and%20New%20Mexico%20Statehood.pdf.
77. Lux, supra note 73, at Part I. R
78. Id.
79. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 71, at art. VIII. R
80. Lux, supra note 73, at Part I. R
81. Id.
82. Id.; see ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD:
1846–1912 25 (1968). In 1906 Congress passed a joint statehood bill for New Mexico
and Arizona. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 76. If the voters of either R
territory rejected joint statehood, the territory would not be admitted to the Union as
one state. Id. Arizona passed a resolution opposing joint statehood and later
presented to Congress another protest which “prophesied that New Mexico would
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Union longer that any other territory that had petitioned for statehood.83
It has been asserted that the guarantees set forth in the treaty “served to
retard progress toward achieving statehood.”84 The general sentiment
seemed to be that of prejudice toward Spanish-speaking people and their
Catholic background and culture, or as one congressman called the na-
tives “a race speaking an alien tongue.”85 Even more pointedly, it was
argued that statehood should be withheld “until every inhabitant had
learned to read and write the English language.”86
This was the backdrop for the New Mexico Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1910. There were many reasons for the Spanish-speaking popula-
tion of New Mexico to require a state constitution that would adequately
protect their interests. The rights set forth in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo were reasserted in article II, section 5, of the constitution: “The
rights, privileges and immunities, civil, political and religious guaranteed
to the people of New Mexico by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo shall
be preserved inviolate.”87 Other protections for Spanish-speaking people
in New Mexico were expressly set forth in the state constitution of 1911.88
control the constitutional convention and impose her dual language conditions on
Arizona.” Id. Arizona claimed:
[T]he decided racial difference between the people of New Mexico, who are
not only different in race and largely in language, but have entirely different
customs, laws and ideals and would have but little prospect of successful amal-
gamation . . . [and] the objection of the people of Arizona, 95 percent of
whom are Americans, to the probability of the control of public affairs by
people of a different race, many of whom do not speak the English language,
and who outnumber the people of Arizona two to one.
Id. (alterations in original) (citing S. DOC. NO. 216, at 1–2 (1906)).
83. Lux, supra note 73, at Part II. R
84. Id.
85. LARSON, supra note 82, at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
86. Lux, supra note 73, at Part III (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting R
Robert Larsson from an unidentified source).
87. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 5.
88. For example the constitution provides:
(1) “The right of any citizen of the state to vote, hold office or sit upon juries,
shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of religion, race,
language or color, or inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish
languages except as may be otherwise provided in this constitution . . . .”
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (emphasis added); (2) “The legislature shall provide for the
training of teachers in the normal schools or otherwise so that they may become profi-
cient in both the English and Spanish languages . . . .” N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (em-
phasis added); (3) “Children of Spanish descent in the state of New Mexico shall
never be denied the right and privilege of admission and attendance in the public
schools or other public educational institutions . . . and they shall never be classed in
separate schools . . . .” N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10 (emphasis added); (4) “For the first
twenty years after this constitution goes into effect all laws passed by the legislature
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Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, four of these sections of the con-
stitution were shielded from significant changes, and as such, they are
called the “unamendables.”89 Extraordinary majorities were required for
proposing and amending these particular sections of the New Mexico
Constitution.90 The inclusion of the extraordinary majority requirement
reflects New Mexicans’ desire to preserve and protect its culture and the
rights of Spanish speakers in the state, which is clearly rooted in its spo-
ken language.
The New Mexico Constitution was ratified on January 21, 1911, by
an overwhelming majority of the state.91 The following year, on February
14, 1912, New Mexico was admitted to the Union.92 Given these facts,
there is no need to point out the importance placed, by New Mexicans, on
requiring certain guarantees—in addition to those that would already be
theirs under the U.S. Constitution—that protect the Spanish-speaking
population of this state. Each of those protections originally set forth in
the state constitution remain to this day.93
The Spanish language and all who sought to preserve it are an irref-
utable and significant part of New Mexico’s history. This is evident even
today if one examines New Mexico’s present characteristics. Perhaps be-
shall be published in both the English and Spanish languages and thereafter such
publication shall be made as the legislature may provide.” N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 12
(emphasis added); and (5)
The secretary of state shall cause any such amendment or amendments to be
published . . . once each week, for four consecutive weeks, in English and
Spanish when newspapers in both of said languages are published in such
counties, the last publication to be not more than two weeks prior to the elec-
tion at which time said amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the
electors of the state for their approval or rejection; and shall further provide
notice of the content and purpose of legislatively approved constitutional
amendments in both English and Spanish to inform electors about the amend-
ments in the time and manner provided by law.
N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (emphasis added).
89. NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT, supra note 75, at 222; see also N.M. CONST. art. R
XIX, § 1 (as amended Nov. 7, 1911, and Nov. 5, 1996.) (“No amendment shall restrict
the rights created by Sections One and Three of Article VII hereof, on elective
franchise, and Sections Eight and Ten of Article XII hereof, on education, unless it be
proposed by vote of three-fourths of the members elected to each house and be rati-
fied by a vote of the people of this state in an election at which at least three-fourths
of the electors voting on the amendment vote in favor of that amendment.”).
90. See NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT, supra note 75, at 238. The super-majority R
requirement was later held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution in State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968).
91. NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT, supra note 75, at 223. There were 31,742 in favor R
and 13,399 opposed. Id.
92. LARSON supra note 82, at 304. R
93. See N.M. CONST. art. VII § 3, art. XII §§ 8, 10, art. XX § 12 & art. XIX § 1.
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cause of the unique standing that Spanish enjoys in the state, there re-
main a large number of Spanish speakers in New Mexico.94 In fact, New
Mexico has the third highest percentage of Spanish-only speakers in the
nation.95 Only California and Texas have a higher percentage,96 and, nota-
bly, these two states share in New Mexico’s history as part of the land
ceded in 1864.97 The most recent U.S. Census Bureau reports that there
are 485,681 Spanish speakers in this state—29 percent of the population.98
Of this number, 158,629 speak English “less than very well.”99 This is a
significant number of Spanish-only speaking individuals.
Accordingly, many New Mexico statutes and regulations require bi-
lingual forms and documents—some even require Spanish notice.100 For
example, one statute provides highly specific instructions on whether and
when English and/or Spanish publications are required.101
94. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 71. R
95. See id.
96. See id. This does not include Puerto Rico, which is a territory of the United
States. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that 75.2 percent of Puerto Ricans speak
Spanish. Id. 65.8 percent of that group speaks English “not well or at all.” Id. That
means that 49.5 percent of all Puerto Ricans can be considered Spanish-only speakers.
Id.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77. R
98. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 71. R
99. Id.
100. NMSA 1978, §§ 14-11-11 (1923), 49-2-4 (1917), 73-8-3 (1917), 27-6-17(A)(1)
(1993); 11.5.6 NMCA; 11.6.2.10 NMCA; 17.5.410 NMCA; 17.11.16 NMCA; 19.15.39
NMCA; 20.2.72 NMCA; 20.4.5 NMCA; 20.6.2 NMCA; 20.9.2 NMCA; 20.9.20.19
NMCA.
101. It states:
In all counties, cities or towns, in which the publication [population] is not less
than seventy-five percent English speaking, the publication of such notices in
English shall be sufficient; that in all counties, cities and towns, in which the
population is not less than seventy-five percent Spanish speaking, the publica-
tion of such notices in the Spanish language shall be sufficient; that in all
counties, cities and towns, in which the publication [population] using either
language is between twenty-five percent and seventy-five percent of the
whole, such notices shall be published in both English and Spanish . . . . And,
provided further, that in case of question, or disagreement, as to the percent-
age of the population . . . using either language, the district judge . . . shall
determine such percentage upon such information as he may have, without
special investigation in the matter, and his opinion and determination thereon
shall be conclusive.
NMSA 1978, § 14-11-11. One regulation states:
The public notice shall . . . be published once in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in each county . . . and at one other place in the newspaper calculated
to give the general public the most effective notice, and when appropriate
shall be printed in both English and Spanish.
20.9.2.15 (B)(7) NMAC.
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In total, at least sixteen statutes and regulations require or provide
for Spanish-language “notice.”102 Given the many instances that bilingual
notice and publication is provided for by statute and regulation, it seems
a modest step to extend such right to notice in administrative and other
contexts to Spanish-only speaking individuals in the state. Indeed, by do-
ing so, the state might eliminate the need to spell out such a requirement
in so many statutes and regulations, as state constitutional law would
mandate it. Additional evidence of a broad public policy stance on the
special standing of the Spanish language in New Mexico can be found in
the state’s official adoption of a Spanish state salute, song, and bilingual
song.103 In effect, New Mexico has adopted Spanish as a quasi-official lan-
guage. The state has protected it and given it special status as evidenced
by the original and enduring state constitution, past and present statutory
law, and regulatory law.
While the adoption of Spanish as a quasi-official language of the
state is not conclusive, it bolsters the argument for required bilingual no-
tice in two meaningful ways. For one, it demonstrates that any “burden”
presented by requiring bilingual notice cannot be said to be unreasonable
when weighed against individuals’ rights. On the contrary, it seems that
the opposite is true: bilingual translation in this state is completely feasi-
ble and very reasonable. Secondly, it presents a viable basis for expanding
rights under the New Mexico Constitution based on distinctive state char-
acteristics under the Gomez analysis.
B. Weighing the Burden of Translation on the State Against the Interests
of the Individual
As established, the United States is primarily an English-speaking
nation. In light of this reality, perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that in
many instances, English-language notice to Spanish-only speakers is con-
stitutionally sufficient under the federal Constitution. However, this is not
New Mexico’s reality, and this fact must be taken into account when con-
sidering the sufficiency of English-only notice in New Mexico because the
Mullane requirement, i.e., notice reasonable under the circumstances, is
necessarily a fact-specific analysis. Of factual significance is that New
Mexico has the third highest percentage of Spanish speakers in the na-
tion.104 It is a state that has protected Spanish-language rights longer than
it has been a state.105 The constitutionality of notice is based, in part, on
102. See supra note 100. R
103. See NMSA 1978, §§ 12-3-6 (1971), 12-3-7 (1973), 12-3-12 (1995).
104. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 71. R
105. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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the burden on the state in providing notice most likely to inform as
weighed against the potential loss to the individual. Therefore, the main
question under the Mullane requirement, which New Mexico has adopted
as state law,106 is whether the burden on the State of New Mexico posed
by requiring translation of notice into Spanish outweighs the right and
potential loss by an individual so as to render it unreasonable and thus
non-compulsory.107 The answer is apparent. How can a state that has, in
essence, adopted Spanish as a quasi-official language, protected under
state constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law, claim that the burden
of translation is too much? When a state makes an effort to identify Span-
ish-only speakers and accommodate them by providing official forms in
Spanish, thus making it possible to function in society without having to
learn English, the state has incrementally changed the balance in favor of
the individual and weakened its argument that the burden of translation
is too much. Hence, even the relatively minor possible adverse claims
against an individual’s life, liberty or property interest in any context—
including administrative proceedings—outweighs any imagined burden
that can be advanced. In other words, even the potential loss of some-
thing like a driver’s license, which is a relatively minor liberty interest,
presents a situation in which the balance between the individual and the
state weighs in favor of the individual because the burden on the state
posed by having to translate is so minimal.
Determining the burden on the state, like determining what is rea-
sonable under the circumstances, is a fact-specific analysis. In this in-
stance, the burden on the state would be exclusively the cost of
translating notice from English into Spanish. Any time that notice is re-
quired, the cost of writing, printing, and serving notice is going to be pre-
sent regardless of whether that notice is written in English or Spanish.108
106. See supra Part II.A.2.
107. The New Mexico Court of Appeals posed the question as “not whether Driver
understood the notice that he received, but whether personal service of an English-
language notice is reasonably calculated to inform drivers of the ten-day time limit for
contesting administrative revocation of a driver’s license.” Maso v. N.M. Taxation &
Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 19, 85 P.3d 276, 282.
108. Because this note does not address any specific situation, and instead advo-
cates for Spanish notice for Spanish-only speakers in all contexts, it is important to
point out that different situations may present additional, albeit, minor burdens, on
the state. For example, in a Maso situation, the officer serving notice on a Spanish-
speaking individual will need to make sure that they have bilingual and/or Spanish-
language notice on their person or police vehicle. This is so because the statute re-
quires personal notice to the defendant. NMSA 1978, § 66-8-111.1 (2003). Nonethe-
less, this additional consideration is truly minor in the overall picture and does not tip
the balancing scales in favor of the state.
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The only thing that changes if Spanish-language notice is required is the
additional cost of having to translate a document. The cost of translation
in a state with a significant number of Spanish speakers cannot possibly
exceed a reasonable fee.109 There is even a chance that the governmental
body responsible for writing these notices will have an employee on staff
who is capable of translating the notice. This would eliminate the need to
obtain an independent translator at additional cost to the state.
Justice Tobriner’s dissent in Guerrero, the California case noted ear-
lier and discussed infra, also lends some valuable insight on balancing the
individual and state’s respective interests and burdens.
If some ‘forms’ are now printed in Spanish it cannot be unduly
burdensome to print [an additional] form in Spanish . . . Indeed,
every apologetic assertion as to that which the departments now
do to communicate in Spanish is an argument that it is no great
burden to do that which the Constitution requires.110
Even if English-only notice is defended on the grounds that it may
reasonably be assumed that recipients will get notice translated, it is a
stretch to conclude that this equates to notice “reasonably certain to in-
form” a Spanish-only speaker of their interests and of their right to a
hearing.111 Justice Tobriner sets forth two reasons that this is so. First, the
recipient may not appreciate the need for translation.112 If in the past, a
particular agency or other governmental entity accommodated the indi-
vidual by providing Spanish forms, that individual might expect any par-
ticularly important documents will be in Spanish as well.113 Otherwise,
109. Interesting fact about cost of translation: In 1915, the state legislature appro-
priated $ 2,000 to translate the code from English into Spanish. State ex rel. Sedillo v.
Sargent, 24 N.M. 333, 171 P. 790 (1918).
110. Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 840 (Cal. 1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 841.
112. Id. at 842. This is harder to argue in a Maso scenario. Nonetheless, being
handed a document by a police officer during a traffic stop may implicitly alert the
recipient of the need for translation, but it does not give any clue as to how promptly
the translation need be obtained.
113. Id. In New Mexico, many administrative agencies, including the MVD, have
bilingual forms and manuals, one of which allows the driver’s license exam to be ad-
ministered in Spanish. N.M. MOTOR VEHICLE DEP’T, NEW MEXICO DRIVER’S MAN-
UAL IN SPANISH (2011), available at http://www.mvd.newmexico.gov/SiteCollection
Documents/assets/dlms.pdf. Thus, in Maso’s situation, it can be argued that if he was
able to obtain a driver’s license through use of the agency’s Spanish-language forms, it
would be reasonable for him to expect that any notice of his right to the retain his
license would also be in Spanish. This is especially true when notice is sent via mail.
How is a recipient supposed to determine whether something looks important enough
to warrant translation? Many documents are purposefully made to look official so
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there might be an assumption that the document was not important
enough to warrant translation.114 Secondly, even if the individual recog-
nizes the need for translation, it may be obtained too late to invoke the
individual’s right to a hearing.115 Additionally, the recipient would have to
consider how to secure a proper translation to ensure that it was accu-
rate.116 The time and possible expense in seeking the translation shifts the
burden from the sender to the recipient and makes the possibility of ob-
taining a translation within enough time to assert one’s right less feasible.
Additionally, placing this burden upon the recipient places that individual
in a position that requires them to reveal potentially personal information
that they may not wish to disclose. In essence, the assumption that Span-
ish-only speakers will obtain a translation places the burden of obtaining
notice on the recipient despite it being the obligation of the party serving
notice to ensure that they employ notice reasonably certain to inform. It is
true that the recipient must not seek to avoid notice, but failing to realize
the need for translation at all, or within the required time, is a far cry
from intentionally seeking to evade notice.
The burden of translating notice into Spanish in New Mexico cannot
be said to be a “heroic effort” on the part of the government.117 Indeed,
anything less than Spanish notice to a Spanish-only speaker in New Mex-
ico would be a “mere gesture”—like publishing notice in a newspaper
intended for parties whose addresses are readily available and can be eas-
ily served notice through mail.118 If one knows the recipient’s address and
it is feasible to send them notice via mail, then it is unreasonable to pub-
lish notice in the newspaper.119 Similarly, if one knows someone only
speaks Spanish, and it is feasible to provide a Spanish notice, then it is
unreasonable to provide English-only notice. Though actual notice is not
necessarily required in all contexts, when other feasible and customary
substitutes that might easily achieve actual notice are available, it must be
employed or it fails to meet the Mullane standard.120 “Notice is the birth-
that recipients are more likely to open them. Thus, it is unreasonable to place the
burden of determining whether something needs to be translated on the individual.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Hernandez v. Dep’t of Labor, 416 N.E. 2d 263 (Ill. 1981) (recipients re-
ceived notice of denial of unemployment benefits and promptly sought translation
from friends who translated the notice inaccurately and incompletely); DaLomba v.
Dir. of Div. of Emp’t Sec., 337 N.E. 2d 687 (Mass. 1975) (same).
117. See Dunsenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).
118. This was the factual situation and reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
119. Id. at 318.
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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right of all people in this country, not just those who are vigilant enough
to make daily inquiry about the status of proceedings, or to seek indepen-
dent explanation of otherwise incomprehensible forms.”121 The Constitu-
tion’s “guarantees are theirs by right, not by charity.”122
Finally, in addressing a common argument presented by Guerrero
and like decisions, dissenting opinions by Justice Tobriner and Chief Jus-
tice Wilentz have already handily refuted the assertion that to extend no-
tice in one language would result in a requirement that it be extended in
all languages. As part of the Mullane analysis, courts have said that pro-
viding Spanish-language notice to Spanish-only speakers is unreasonable
because it could not be limited to Spanish alone.123 It would result in a
requirement to provide notice in all foreign languages, or at least rela-
tively common foreign languages.124 It would also, then, require the gov-
ernment to conduct all its affairs in every language spoken by any person
in the jurisdiction.125 This, in turn, would present an unreasonable—in-
deed disabling—burden to the state. This argument is simply without
merit. Because the Mullane standard requires reasonableness in light of
the circumstances and because it is not necessarily reasonable to provide
notice in all languages (because perhaps very few individuals speak a par-
ticular language), the burden on the state will change depending on the
language involved. As Justice Tobriner points out in Guerrero, “[u]nder a
different set of circumstances, the balance of interests between individual
and state may be entirely different and may accordingly dictate a differ-
ent result.”126 Likewise, Chief Justice Wilentz, a former Chief Justice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, has stated, “for Spanish-speaking per-
sons . . . the benefits of providing Spanish language notice outweigh the
burdens as a matter of law. As to persons speaking other languages, the
balancing test of proper due process analysis would have to be applied
when that case arose.”127 Since the analysis in this note is confined to
Spanish and benefits and burdens as it applies to New Mexico, other
states’ concerns regarding potential foreign language notice requirements
should be addressed using the Mullane standard, when and if that situa-
tion arises.
121. Alfonso v. Bd. of Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1085 (N.J. 1982) (Wilentz, C.J.,
dissenting).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 837–38 (Cal. 1973).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 838.
126. Id. at 843 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
127. Alfonso, 444 A.2d at 1084 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
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C. Other Jurisdictions’ Contrary Conclusions Provide Rationales for
Reaching a Different Result Consistent with New Mexico’s History
State and federal cases on this issue, in general, reflect an unwilling-
ness to conclude that anything but English-only notice is required to sat-
isfy due process. California was one of the first jurisdictions to address
the issue of sufficiency of English-language notice to Spanish-only speak-
ers. In 1973, the Supreme Court of California held, in Guerrero v.
Carleson, that English-language notice to a Spanish-only speaker was
constitutional notice under the Mullane requirement.128 Like Maso, the
factual context was that of an administrative proceeding in which claim-
ants challenged the state’s failure to provide Spanish-language notice
prior to terminating and reducing welfare benefits.129 The court concluded
that Spanish notice would be “desirable and should be encouraged, [but]
it does not rise to the level of a constitutional imperative.”130 After stating
the standard set forth in Mullane, the court determined that it was “not
unreasonable for the state to expect that persons such as those in plain-
tiffs’ position will promptly arrange to have someone translate the con-
tents of the notice.”131 Thus, the court found that the notice satisfied due
process.132
The opinion also contained sentiments appearing to endorse English
as the official language of the United States and of California. The court
declared, “[t]he United States is an English speaking country,” and went
on to highlight a California statute that provided for English-language
notice in all situations where notice was required or authorized by stat-
ute.133 The opinion was met with a strong dissent authored by Justice To-
briner. Justice Tobriner pointed to California’s history, quoting a
128. 512 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1973). Ten years after the Guerrero court issued its deci-
sion, the Second Circuit concluded in Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41–43 (2d
Cir. 1983), that providing Spanish-language services for Spanish-only speakers would
shift discrimination onto all other non-English-speaking groups. This conclusion gives
rise to an Equal Protection consideration. Though it is beyond the purview of this
note, when language considerations are involved that can appear as a proxy for race
or nationality, one must be aware of the Equal Protection questions that may arise.
While no conclusions are offered on the subject, some may argue that an extension of
Spanish-language notice may violate federal constitutional law.
129. Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 833.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 837.
132. Id. at 836–37.
133. Id. at 835. This is not also true of New Mexico. As noted previously, New
Mexico has not adopted English as its official language and, in fact, requires notice to
be in English and/or Spanish in many instances. See supra note 100 and accompanying R
text.
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California decision issued only three years prior, in which the Supreme
Court of California struck down a section of the state’s constitution that
conditioned the right to vote on one’s ability to read English:
We cannot refrain from observing that if a contrary conclusion
were compelled it would indeed be ironic that petitioners, who are
the heirs of a great and gracious culture, identified with the birth
of California and contributing in no small measure to its growth,
should be disenfranchised in their ancestral land, despite their ca-
pacity to cast an informed vote.134
After agreeing with the majority that Mullane controlled, the dissent
articulated the issue as turning on the “relative importance of adequate
notice to the welfare recipient and the corresponding burden to the de-
partments in printing the notice in Spanish.”135 The burden to the state, he
concluded, was minimal, as demonstrated by facts noted in the majority
opinion, including the welfare department’s effort to (1) identify Spanish-
only speakers; and (2) provide welfare forms in Spanish to those individu-
als.136 The state’s effort and ability to provide these services demonstrated
that the burden was relatively minimal as compared to a crucial loss of
benefits by the recipients.137 Thus, in Justice Tobriner’s opinion, the En-
glish-language notice provided violated the Fourteenth Amendment.138
The dissent also addressed the state’s successful arguments that an
agency is safe in assuming that a reasonable person would have the notice
translated and that to require Spanish-language notice would lead to a
requirement that all notices be printed in all languages.139 As discussed
supra, Justice Tobriner attacked the majority’s reasoning, noting that the
state’s assumption that one will have the notice translated “is a far cry
from finding that the notices are ‘reasonably certain to inform’” the re-
cipient of crucial information regarding benefits and of the right to a
hearing.140 The recipient may not appreciate the need to have the docu-
ment translated, and even if the need is realized and the translation is
obtained, the time period for requesting a hearing on the matter may
have lapsed.141 Justice Tobriner concluded that this type of notice violated
134. Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 839–40 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (quoting Castro v. Cali-
fornia, 466 P.2d 244, 259 (Cal. 1970) (internal quotations omitted)).
135. Id. at 841.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 842.
140. Id. (emphasis omitted).
141. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-2\NMX209.txt unknown Seq: 24 24-JAN-12 10:46
626 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
Mullane because requiring the recipient to get the notice translated was
not notice reasonably certain to inform the recipient of the need to re-
quest a hearing.142
With regard to the state’s second assertion that notice would then
need to be translated into all languages, Justice Tobriner found it to be
“irrational.”143 He noted that procedural due process requires a weighing
of the burden on the state against the individual’s right in that situation,
and since the state has already taken steps to recognize the significant
number of Spanish speakers and has provided many forms in Spanish, the
burden of translation into Spanish is truly very slight.144 That, of course,
cannot also be said of all languages, such as Basque or Chippewa, as Jus-
tice Tobriner pointed out.145 The state need not provide notice in these
languages because so few recipients speak those languages and thus, the
expense and burden of translation and printing notices in these languages
would be unreasonable.146 In short, the balance between the state and the
individual might be completely different if there were a different lan-
guage involved, and, as such, a different result required.147 But, given this
balance, the Spanish-speaking individual’s right clearly outweighs the
burden placed on the state.148 Justice Tobriner concludes, “[i]n the long
effort of the subgroups in our culture to attain recognition and participa-
tion the majority opinion can only be an unfortunate step backwards.”149
The conclusions reached by the Guerrero court are unpersuasive as
they apply to New Mexico. Guerrero and the policy that it advances serve
only as a comparison point to New Mexico law and policy that then bol-
sters the argument for enhanced protections based on distinctive state
characteristics. First, the argument for broader state constitutional protec-
tions in New Mexico is based on distinctive state characteristics. It fol-
lows, then, that any other jurisdiction’s reasoning on the issue ought not
carry binding weight. However, New Mexico and California do share a
similar history as former Mexican entities. Perhaps, then, California
courts’ reasoning, and failure to consider that history, might carry some
weight in New Mexico. However, this would ignore the states’ respective
histories since joining the Union. In California, a strong anti-Hispanic
sentiment developed that culminated in Proposition 63, which aimed to
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 842–43.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 843.
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amend the state constitution to declare English the state’s official lan-
guage.150 In 1986, the proposition passed by an overwhelming majority—
74 percent in favor.151 It did not end there. In 1998, the “English for the
Children” initiative appeared on the state ballot for possible approval by
the California voters.152 This initiative, Proposition 227, in effect, pro-
posed to eliminate bilingual educational programs for non-English speak-
ers in the state’s public school system.153 Although the proposition was
rejected (61 to 39 percent),154 it reflects the sentiment in California during
that time period. The fact that it even appeared on the ballot, and 39
percent of the voters approved of it, demonstrates that the anti-Spanish,
anti-Hispanic movement was far from over.
Indeed, other jurisdictions have addressed the Spanish-language no-
tice issue similarly to the Guerrero majority.155 The majority opinion in
Guerrero has been widely cited and, for the most part, followed, almost
always with a dissenter echoing Justice Tobriner’s reasoning.156 Scholars
have criticized the decision and those that follow suit,157 but the holding
has proved to be enduring. Like California, many of those states follow-
ing suit proposed and passed English-only and similar initiatives.158 Most
recently, in 2003, Arizona passed Proposition 203—the anti-bilingual ini-
tiative, which essentially imposes a statewide English-only mandate in
schools and prohibits native language instruction for limited English-
150. See Yang Sao Xiong & Min Zhou, Structuring Inequity: How California Selec-
tively Tests, Classifies, and Tracks Language Minority Students, in CALIFORNIA POL-
ICY OPTIONS 2006, at 145, 146 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell ed., 2006), available at http://www.
spa.ucla.edu/calpolicy/files06/Xiong_Zhou_Policy_Paper_Sept30_2005_Final_1II.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martı´nez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case
of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227,
1227 (2000).
154. Xiong & Zhou, supra note 150, at 146. R
155. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983); Alonso v. Arabel,
Inc., 622 So.2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hernandez v. Dep’t of Labor, 416 N.E.
2d 263 (Ill. 1981); DaLomba v. Dir. Of Div. of Emp’t Sec., 337 N.E. 2d 687 (Mass.
1975); Alfonso v. Bd. of Review, 444 A.2d 1075 (N.J. 1982).
156. See supra note 155. R
157. See Mary K. Gillespie & Cynthia G. Schneider, Are Non-English-Speaking
Claimants Served by Unemployment Compensation Programs? The Need for Bilingual
Services, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 333 (1995–96); Charles F. Adams, Comment,
“Citado A Comparecer”: Language Barriers and Due Process—Is Mailed Notice in
English Constitutionally Sufficient?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (1973); Mary Beth Diez,
Note, Bilingual Notice Not Required—Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d
833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), 1 PEPP. L. REV. 297 (1974); Note, El Derecho de Aviso:
Due Process and Bilingual Notice, 83 YALE L.J. 385 (1973).
158. Adams, supra note 157, at 1396–98. R
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speaking students.159 In direct contrast, New Mexico state policy has
never reflected an anti-bilingual sentiment.160 In other jurisdictions, only
recently has there been caselaw that points to courts’ willingness to move
away from Guerrero.
In 2010, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited Guerrero, but reached
a different conclusion.161 The court held that police officers must inform
motorists of the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test in a
language, in this case Spanish, that the motorist understands.162 The court
was presented with facts nearly identical to those in Maso; however, the
defendant in this case was arrested for failing to comply with the state’s
implied consent law rather than for violating a DWI statute.163 The state’s
appellate court, the Superior Court of New Jersey, held that due process
had been satisfied when an officer read the state’s implied consent warn-
ings in English despite the knowledge that Marquez, the defendant, only
spoke Spanish.164 The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certiorari
and reversed the lower court. The court found that the plain language of
the statute required that a police officer “inform” the individual, and
since Marquez did not understand the statement because he did not un-
derstand English, he was not informed within the meaning of the
statute.165
The court did not base its holding on a violation of due process;
rather, the decision was based on an interpretation of the statutory re-
quirement that the driver be “inform[ed].”166 Nonetheless, the court’s rea-
soning can be applied in the context of due process, and it demonstrates
that, perhaps, other jurisdictions are ready to recognize the rights of
Spanish speakers through state law, if not federal.
159. Xiong & Zhou, supra note 150, at 146. R
160. Under Governor Susana Martinez’s administration, there has been a push to
revoke licenses that were issued to non-U.S. citizens. Because of New Mexico’s prox-
imity to Mexico, many of the state’s alien residents are Mexican nationals, who speak
Spanish. Perhaps this is the first indication of a state agent-backed anti-Spanish senti-
ment in the state. See, for example, Press Release, State of New Mexico: Office of the
Governor, Governor Susana Martinez Directs TRD, MVD Officials to Improve the
Security of New Mexico Driver’s Licenses (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/PressRelease/191a415014634aa89604e0b4790e4768/110
622_2.pdf.
161. New Jersey v. Marquez, 998 A.2d 421 (N.J. 2010).
162. Id. at 436.
163. Id. at 425–26.
164. New Jersey v. Marquez, 974 A.2d 1092, 1096–97 (2009) (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2009), rev’d 998 A.2d 421 (N.J. 2010).
165. Marquez, 998 A.2d at 439.
166. Id.
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Thus, because the argument posited here is based on New Mexico’s
distinctive state characteristics and because other jurisdictions’ contrary
conclusions do not align with the history, policy stance, and reasonable-
ness consideration in New Mexico, New Mexico courts should not look to
those jurisdictions as persuasive authority. To the extent that jurisdictions
like New Jersey recognize the importance of ensuring that all individuals
understand their rights, New Mexico courts can borrow and incorporate
their reasoning to form state law that reflects the Spanish language’s spe-
cial status in the state.
D. Gomez’s Interstitial Approach Supports a More Capacious
Interpretation of New Mexico’s Due Process Clause
When interpreting New Mexico constitutional provisions that are
analogous to those in the federal Constitution, New Mexico courts have
adopted the interstitial approach.167 Under the interstitial approach,
which New Mexico formally adopted in Gomez, the first inquiry is
whether the U.S. Constitution protects the right in question.168 Here, that
right is one of Spanish-language notice to known Spanish-only speakers
as a requirement of procedural due process.
While the federal courts have articulated a standard for constitu-
tional notice (Mullane), the Supreme Court has yet to address the specific
right at issue. At least one federal circuit court has addressed Spanish-
language notice under a procedural due process analysis, but it did not
conclude that Spanish-language notice is a requirement of due process in
any circumstance including the relevant context.169 Rather, the consensus
indicates that English-only notice, especially in administrative proceed-
ings, is constitutionally sufficient.170 Thus, it is clear that the federal
courts, in their interpretation of the federal constitution, have failed to
protect this right.
The next step in the Gomez interstitial analysis is determining
whether there are grounds for diverging from federal law.171 As stated
previously, there are three reasons that a state court may diverge: (1) a
flawed federal analysis; (2) structural differences between the state and
federal government; or (3) distinctive state characteristics.172 While at
least two grounds are viable reasons for diverging from federal precedent
in the present issue, it is New Mexico’s distinctive state characteristics
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.
168. Id.
169. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
170. See discussion supra Part II.A.
171. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. R
172. Id.
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that primarily warrant an expansion of rights for Spanish-only speakers in
the state.
The factors that contribute to the argument for broader state proce-
dural due process rights for Spanish-only speakers in New Mexico based
on distinctive state characteristics are: (1) the historical background of
the state including the original iteration and surviving constitutional pro-
tections for Spanish-language speakers explicit in the 1911 version; (2)
other New Mexico laws and regulations that require bilingual forms, doc-
uments, and publications, which bolster arguments about the state’s
broadly interpreted public policy stance requiring Spanish-language no-
tices; (3) the language characteristics of New Mexico’s current popula-
tion; (4) the arguably low burden on the state in translating notice for
Spanish-only speakers as weighed against the right and potential impact
on the individual; and (5) a survey of other jurisdictions’ conclusions on
the subject and analysis of the reasoning as it applies to New Mexico.
These factors have already, in large part, been discussed in the previous
sections. Thus, the following summarizes those considerations and
arguments.
First, New Mexico courts should not ignore the fact that New Mex-
ico was, at one time, a primarily Spanish-speaking state. History makes
that quite clear. Additionally, the desire to protect the Spanish-speaking
population of this state from infringements on individual rights was made
clear by language in the original iteration of the state constitution—lan-
guage that remains today.173 Since statehood to present-day, there has ex-
isted a strong public policy in favor of preserving the Spanish-language
and in ensuring that the Spanish-language is afforded significant legiti-
macy and standing in New Mexico law as reflected in the many state stat-
utes and regulations which require or authorize information to be
published in both English and Spanish languages.174 Indeed, some of
those sources of law protect not only a general equality of treatment of
the Spanish-language, but in many instances, recognize an express right
to Spanish notice, especially in instances where a significant number of
Spanish-speakers exist. Further, the quasi-official status of Spanish as a
language arguably equal in standing to English, reflects the state’s policy
stance as reflected in the current translation of numerous official forms
and thus renders irrational any argument that the burden of translation of
documents from Spanish into English is too great for this state. Because
Spanish-language notice would be so feasible and inexpensive, it is unrea-
sonable to only require English-language notice. This is so especially
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. R
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when one considers the importance of any potential loss of a life, liberty,
or property interest in any context, be it an administrative proceeding or
a judicial proceeding.
Finally, because this argument is based on distinctive state charac-
teristics, other jurisdictions’ contrary conclusions on the issue are simply
inapposite and, more importantly, unpersuasive. California’s decision in
Guerrero reflects its state policy during the time that it was rendered,175
not New Mexico’s. Even though most jurisdictions have jumped on the
Guerrero bandwagon, New Mexico does not share their history and they
do not share in the uniqueness of New Mexico’s protections for Spanish
speakers. Put simply, the needs of New Mexico’s current population, the
ability and reasonableness of providing notice actually intended to in-
form, and the distinctiveness of the Spanish language in this state all point
to one conclusion: New Mexico courts should not hesitate to expand no-
tice requirements under the New Mexico Constitution. It was best stated
by former New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Wilentz in dissent,
“[W]hen, implicitly and explicitly, Spanish has achieved some measure of
official recognition, the Spanish-speaking population may reasonably ex-
pect that information of great importance to their well-being will be con-
veyed to them in a manner that communicates the essential information
required.”176 This note does not propose a giant leap, but a modest and
natural extension of law and policy that already exists in New Mexico.
Thus, when another Maso situation arises, be it in the context of a DWI,
property rights, or welfare benefits,177 it would be astute to assert the ar-
guments advanced in this note, and the New Mexico Supreme Court
should be proud to accept it as a basis for extending this right.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico is a distinctive state with a distinctive history, and its
population’s characteristics necessitate unique state protections. Its his-
tory, while not dispositive of the due process issue, favors interpreting the
New Mexico Constitution differently from the federal Constitution in
particular areas of law—namely, those areas that are influenced by our
distinct history and present characteristics.
175. See PERSPECTIVES ON OFFICIAL ENGLISH: THE CAMPAIGN FOR ENGLISH AS
THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE USA 2–3 (Karen L. Adams & Daniel T. Brink eds.,
1990).
176. Alfonso v. Bd. of Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1084–85 (N.J. 1982) (Wilentz, C.J.,
dissenting).
177. The context in which the situation arises is truly of little importance, the sole
focus should be the issue and potential right for New Mexico’s Spanish speakers.
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For hundreds of years, the Spanish language has had a special stand-
ing in New Mexico—a standing that will continue, evolve, and thrive only
in ways that the people and the law of New Mexico allow. Any failure to
recognize the longstanding and continued importance of the Spanish lan-
guage, the Spanish-speaking people, and the Spanish culture of this state,
is, as Justice Tobriner put it when referring to California, an “iron[y]
that . . . the heirs of a great and gracious culture, identified with the birth
of [New Mexico] and contributing in no small measure to its growth,
should be disenfranchised in their ancestral land.”178 For New Mexico,
such a disenfranchisement of the Spanish language would not only be
ironic, but also distressing, regrettable, and a reflection of our failure to
preserve and continue the rich legacy of this state and protect it through
state law.
The intentions of early New Mexicans, who succeeded in securing
statehood, are clear and enduring. Past and present policies make clear
that Spanish-speaking individuals, by virtue of the language they speak,
have a unique standing in this state. As such, New Mexico courts should
not hesitate to make a modest expansion of notice requirements to en-
sure that Spanish-only speakers have notice reasonably calculated to in-
form them of actions that affect their interests so as to afford an
opportunity to be heard. This is a right that if not protected by the federal
Constitution, must be protected in a state where history and present char-
acteristics demand nothing less. Only then can the rights that were to be
preserved “inviolate” be realized.
It could be the case that New Mexico may one day be the only juris-
diction in the United States to extend such a right, but rightfully so be-
cause the “constitutional deprivation in these matters does not lend
legitimacy to the practice”—it only serves to remind those affected of the
numerous barriers they face as a result of their inability to speak
America’s language.179
178. Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 839–40 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting)
(quoting Castro v. California, 466 P.2d 244, 259 (1970)).
179. Alfonso, 444 A.2d at 1085 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
